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Abstract
An analysis using classical stochastic processes is used to construct a consistent
system of quantum counterfactual reasoning. When applied to a counterfactual version
of Hardy’s paradox, it shows that the probabilistic character of quantum reasoning
together with the “one framework” rule prevents a logical contradiction, and there is
no evidence within this approach for any nonlocal influences. Counterfactual reasoning
can support a realistic interpretation of standard quantum theory (measurements reveal
what is actually there) under appropriate circumstances.
A bullet fired at a beer mug is stopped by a wooden board located between the gun and
the mug. What would have happened if the board had not been present? The answer to
simple counterfactual questions of this sort is intuitively obvious for events in the macro-
scopic “classical” world of everyday experience. Their quantum counterparts, on the other
hand, have given rise to endless controversy. Suppose a Stern-Gerlach apparatus measures
S
z
= 1/2 for a spin half particle. Would S
z
have been 1/2 if the measurement had not been
made? What would have been the result if the apparatus had been set up to measure the
spin in a different direction? Readers familiar with the EPR paradox and Bell’s inequal-
ity [1, 2, 3, 4], Hardy’s paradox [5], and the like are probably aware that even admitting
that such counterfactual questions might have answers can be a dangerous first step into a
conceptual swamp [6]. Nonetheless, counterfactuals seem a necessary part of any realistic
version of quantum theory in which properties of microscopic systems are not simply “cre-
ated” by measurements [7]. And if our everyday experiences take place in a world which is
fundamentally quantum mechanical, as most physicists believe, there must be at least some
cases of valid quantum counterfactuals having to do with boards and bullets and the like.
This article will show how to construct a limited system of quantum counterfactual rea-
soning able to address the issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It extends smoothly
into the “classical” world of everyday experience, where it gives intuitively sensible answers;
alternatively, it represents a possible way to extend some types of classical counterfactual
reasoning [8] into the quantum realm, without fear of generating contradictions. It provides
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Figure 1: (a) Particle scattering from wedges. (b) Schematic representation of possible
histories. (c) Histories with wedge W2 present or absent (∼W2).
a way of understanding a counterfactual version of Hardy’s paradox without coming to the
conclusion that quantum theory involves mysterious nonlocal influences. And it can serve as
one element of a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. In its present form it is restricted
to non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
We begin by considering the classical stochastic process shown in Fig. 1(a): a particle
starting at A moves to the right and scatters randomly off a set of wedges on its way to
a series of detectors, D1, D2 . . .. Suppose the particle arrives at D1. What would have
happened if it had suffered a different deflection at wedge W2? The answer can be read
off of Fig. 1(b), a symbolic representation of possible particle trajectories or histories, by
starting at node D1, moving backwards in time to the pivot point B1, the event immediately
preceding the particle’s encounter with W2, and then forward in time along the alternative,
or counterfactual, branch to D2. Similarly, the question “What would have happened had
the particle scattered the other way atW1?” can be answered by using A as the pivot. Going
forwards in time from A on the alternative (lower branch) in Fig. 1(b), one sees that two
histories, AB2D3 and AB2D4 are possible, and thus the correct answer to this counterfactual
question is not a definite result but instead a probability distribution assigning appropriate
weights to these alternatives. Indeed, in a classical stochastic world, the correct answer
to a counterfactual question will in general be probabilistic; only in special cases will the
probability be one. Even a null counterfactual question, one for which the antecedent actually
occurred, can have a probabilistic answer. For example, the answer to: “What would have
happened had the particle scattered the same way at W1?” (that is, in the same direction in
which it actually did scatter in order to arrive at D1) is a probability distribution with both
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D1 and D2 allowed, rather than D1 alone, if we use Fig 1(b) with A as the pivot. That null
counterfactuals can have this character is typical of a stochastic, in contrast to a deterministic
theory, and has important applications in the case of quantum counterfactuals, as we shall
see. The same strategy can be used to address the question “What would have happened
if wedge W2 had been absent?” given that D1 was observed. Assume that a stochastic
“coin flip”, a purely mechanical process with no human intervention, occurs just before the
particle arrives at W2. Depending on the outcome, the wedge is left in place or yanked out
of the way by a servomechanism. Using Fig. 1(c), with B1 as the pivot, one obtains D5 as
the answer. One can also use A as the pivot, in which case the answer is that either D3, D4,
or D5 would have occurred, with certain probabilities. Both of these results are intuitively
plausible responses to the counterfactual question, interpreted in slightly different ways. The
fact that they are different shows the importance of identifying the pivot when one uses this
approach to counterfactual reasoning.
Our proposal for quantum counterfactual reasoning is to use precisely the same method
of analysis applied to a consistent family or framework of quantum histories: sequences of
events represented by orthogonal projection operators (projectors) to which probabilities
are assigned using the standard dynamical laws of quantum theory [9, 10]. For example,
imagine that the particle in Fig. 1(a) is represented by a wave packet which scatters off
of successive wedges—or think of a photon passing through a succession of beam splitters.
The events B1 and B2 correspond to projectors on appropriate regions of space. A wedge
or other scattering center can be moved out of the way at the last moment based upon a
quantum coin flip: think of a photon passing through a beamsplitter before triggering one of
two photodetectors connected to suitable amplifiers and a servomechanism. Counterfactual
conclusions are then based upon diagrams of the type shown in Fig. 1 in the same way as in
the classical case. The main difference between classical and quantum reasoning comes about
through the fact that quantum events are described using a Hilbert space, and this allows a
multiplicity of stochastic quantum descriptions (frameworks or consistent families or logics)
which are mutually incompatible [9, 10]. Following the usual rules for consistent histories,
we require that a valid counterfactual argument employ a single framework; in particular,
combining results from two incompatible quantum frameworks is not allowed [11].
The multiplicity of possible frameworks gives quantum counterfactual reasoning a slightly
different flavor from its classical counterpart, as shown in the following example. Imagine
that at time t0 a spin half particle with spin in some direction w is traveling towards a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus, and at t1, shortly before it arrives, a quantum coin is “flipped”.
Outcome 1 (“heads”) results in a servomechanism orienting the apparatus so that at time
t2 it is in a state Z appropriate for measuring Sz, while outcome 2 (“tails”) results in an
apparatus state X for measuring S
x
. At time t3 the measurement is complete, and in case 1
(heads) the apparatus is in one of the two states Z+ or Z−, corresponding to a measurement
of S
z
= ±1/2, while in case 2 (tails) the state is X+ or X−, corresponding to S
x
= ±1/2.
One framework for describing this system is indicated schematically in Fig. 2(a), where
the node A at t0 represents the initial state of the particle and the apparatus (including the
quantum coin), the node B at t1 corresponds to the unitary time development of state A,
and the nodes at t2 and t3 indicate the apparatus states before and after the measurements.
Suppose, for example, that S
z
is measured with the result Z+. What would have happened if
the quantum coin flip had yielded 2, resulting in a measurement of S
x
? The answer, obtained
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Figure 2: Two consistent families of histories corresponding to measuring spin components
of a spin half particle in directions determined by flipping a quantum coin.
by starting at node Z+, going backwards to node B (immediately preceding the quantum
coin flip), and then forwards on the lower branch is: X+ or X− with a certain probability,
depending upon the initial spin direction w. This seems intuitively plausible. Applying the
same method of reasoning to the null counterfactual question, “What would have happened
if the quantum coin flip resulted (as it actually did) in a measurement of S
z
?” does not
yield the answer Z+; instead, there are positive probabilities for both Z+ and Z− (unless
the initial spin direction w coincides with z).
A “sharper” answer to this null counterfactual is provided by the alternative framework
in Fig. 2(b) in which the single node B in (a) has been replaced by two nodes z+ and z−
corresponding to particle spin states S
z
= ±1/2 before the quantum coin is flipped, and thus
before the measurement. This framework, which is allowed by consistent histories, though
not by ordinary textbook quantum theory, permits one to say that the measurement result
Z+ reflects the prior state, z+ or S
z
= +1/2, of the measured particle [10]. If the node z+
is used as the pivot, the answer to the null counterfactual question in a case in which Z+
is observed is that Z+ would have been observed (probability 1) if S
z
had been measured
(as it actually was). However, using this same pivot leads to the conclusion that had the
coin resulted in a measurement of X rather than Z, the result would have been (again with
probability 1) the macroscopic quantum superposition (MQS or Schro¨dinger cat) state U+
which results from a unitary time development of a particle with S
z
= +1/2 interacting with
an apparatus arranged to measure S
x
. It is not possible to replace the U+ and U− nodes
in Fig. 2(b) with pairs of X+ and X− nodes without violating the standard consistency
conditions [10].
Thus consistent quantum counterfactual reasoning requires the specification of a consis-
tent family or framework, as does “ordinary” quantum reasoning [12]. Even in a classical
stochastic context, English counterfactual questions are sometimes ambiguous (“What would
have happened if the particle had not arrived at D1?”) because the pivot is not specified,
and in the quantum context the ambiguity can be even worse, because the English wording
(“What would have happened if S
x
had been measured rather than S
z
?”) can often be
modeled by different frameworks, as well as by different pivots within the same framework
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[13]. The confusion caused by this ambiguity is illustrated in the following counterfactual
version [14, 15] of Hardy’s paradox.
Imagine two spin half particles in an appropriate entangled spin state sent in opposite
directions to two distant detectors, one on the left and one on the right. Each detector has
two switch settings, 1 and 2, which determine which spin component will be measured, and
the setting is determined by the flip of a quantum coin, incorporated into the detector, just
before the arrival of the corresponding particle. A red light on the detector flashes if the spin
component in the measured direction is positive, and a green light if it is negative. Each run
yields a result such as 1G·2R, meaning that the left detector had a switch setting of 1 and
flashed green, and the right detector with a switch setting of 2 flashed red. The entangled
particle state [14] is such that 1G·2G, 2G·1G and 1R·1R cannot occur (zero probability); all
other possibilities occur with finite probability.
To construct a paradox, consider a run in which 2G·2G is observed and ask what would
have happened in this particular experimental run if the quantum coin associated with the
right detector had produced a switch setting of 1 rather than 2. In the absence of long-range
influences (in a gedanken experiment, detectors can be arbitrarily far apart!), a last minute
change in the switch setting on the right cannot influence the detector on the left, which
would, therefore, have flashed green. But since 2G·1G never occurs, we conclude that if the
switch on the right had been 1, the result in this run would have been 2G·1R. Applying
the same argument with the roles of the two detectors interchanged, we conclude that if the
switches had been 1 and 2 on left and right, the result would have been 1R·2G. But then,
continuing the argument, had both switches been 1, the result would have been 1R·1R,
contradicting the fact that 1R·1R never occurs. Contradictions of this sort easily gives rise
to the idea that quantum mechanics involves some mysterious nonlocality: changing the
switch setting on the right really does influence the particle or the apparatus on the left in
some way.
The basic counterfactual question which must be addressed in thinking about this para-
dox is the following: given a case in which 2G·2G is observed, what would have occurred had
both of the switch settings been equal to 1? In order to study it using the system of counter-
factual reasoning introduced above, one needs to find a pivot at a time which precedes both
coin flips, since one is comparing cases in which both of them turned out to be the reverse of
what actually occurred. This pivot must involve a quantum state of the two-particle system,
since at this earlier time the apparatus states are not playing a significant role. The succes-
sive counterfactual steps in the preceding paragraph can then be thought of as devices for
finding such a pivot. Viewed in this way, one finds that even the first step of the argument
is problematical. In order to infer 2G·1R from 2G·2G, one must use an earlier state of the
two particles which provides a null counterfactual for the left detector: that is, which leads
with probability one to the conclusion that its light would (certainly) have flashed green.
Simply using the wave function of the original two-particle state as it develops unitarily in
time will not support such a sharp conclusion, as there is then a finite probability of 2R
for the left detector [16]; see the previous discussion of Fig. 2(a). A framework in which
at an earlier time the left particle is in one of the two states corresponding to the results
2G and 2R of a later measurement, analogous to the z+ and z− states of Fig. 2(b), will
yield the desired null counterfactual for the left detector. But there is a price to be paid:
when the switch on the left detector is changed from 2 to 1, quantum consistency requires
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the use of an MQS state for the left detector—see the preceding discussion associated with
Fig. 2(b)—which will obviously prevent completing the full counterfactual argument of what
would have happened had both switches been 1. Note that the MQS problem arises in the
course of constructing a correct quantum (counterfactual) description of a single detector,
the one on the left, not both detectors. Nonlocality plays no role: what matters is consistent
quantum counterfactual reasoning applied to a local measurement.
The framework just discussed is not unique; there are various possibilities which can be
used to justify different steps in the counterfactual argument. However, there is no way to
combine these into a single framework, as required by the rules of counterfactual reasoning
introduced above, in order to complete the entire counterfactual argument in which both
switches are changed from 2 to 1. Were there such a framework it would imply that 1R·1R can
occur with positive probability, at least as large as the probability of 2G·2G. But standard
quantum mechanics gives probability zero for 1R·1R, as does any framework or consistent
family in which the probability of 1R·1R makes sense [17]. Hence there cannot be a single
framework in which the counterfactual inference leading to a paradox is valid. From this
perspective, the Hardy paradox can be thought of as illustrating one of the ways in which
classical reasoning can fail when applied in a quantum context.
Consistent quantum counterfactuals can generate positive results as well as block para-
doxes. Consider the well-known EPR-Bohm arrangement in which two spin-half particles
in a singlet state fly apart, and the x component of the spin of the particle on the right is
measured to be S
x
= +1/2. Assuming that the particle on the left continues on its trajec-
tory without interacting with anything, one can infer (probability 1) that it has S
x
= −1/2
both before and after the spin measurement on the right [18]. But would it still have had
S
x
= −1/2 if S
z
instead of S
x
had been measured for the particle on the right? The answer
is “yes” if one adopts a framework in which S
x
values for the particle on the left make sense
at different times [19]. The argument is straightforward, and only requires combining a
previous consistent history analysis [18] of EPR-Bohm (without using counterfactuals) with
the proposal in the present article. Again, there is no indication of any mysterious nonlocal
influence.
In addition, counterfactual definitions of quantum properties are possible under appropri-
ate circumstances. The analysis given in Sec. 5 of [20] indicates that as long as the behavior
of a closed quantum system is described using a consistent family, the corresponding events
can, in principle, be checked by idealized measurements. If these are thought of as carried
out with the help of appropriate quantum coins, the procedure for counterfactual reasoning
given above supports a realistic interpretation of the corresponding quantum events: they
would still have occurred even if no measurements had been made [21].
In conclusion, the system of consistent quantum counterfactuals presented here, while of
limited scope, is sufficiently powerful to deal with a number of non-trivial issues in quantum
foundations, and could well prove to be a useful tool for getting rid of some of the ghosts
which have long plagued that discipline.
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